

## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

### THE INTERPRETATION OF SOPHOCLES *ANTIGONE* 926

ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὖν τάδ' ἐστὶν ἐν θεοῖς καλὰ, 925  
 παθόντες ἂν ξυγγοῖμεν ἡμαρτηκότες·  
 εἰ δ' οἶδ' ἁμαρτάνουσι, μὴ πλείω κακὰ  
 πάθοιεν ἢ καὶ δρῶσιν ἐκδίκως ἐμέ.

Ξυγγοῖμεν (926) is usually translated as either “be / become conscious that” or “acknowledge / confess that” and is most often construed with ἡμαρτηκότες as a participle in indirect discourse. The first of these interpretations is that implied by the *scholia vetera* (ad loc.: εἰ ταῦτα τοῖς θεοῖς ἀρέσκει παθόντες τὴν τιμωρίαν (ἂν) γνοίημεν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν), while the second can be traced back directly to Hermann’s note in the second edition (1823) of Erfurdt’s *Antigone*.<sup>1</sup> In this note Hermann rejected the scholiast’s interpretation and asserted, without supplying reasons, that ξυγγοῖμεν is to be translated *fatebimur*.<sup>2</sup> Such was Hermann’s prestige in his day that numerous contemporary commentators felt obliged to note his interpretation, even if only to reject it, in their observations on this verse. Later scholars, seeing Hermann’s views discussed by so many earlier critics, would naturally assume that they represented a major alternative interpretation of the text, and one that they themselves would have to take into account, along with the *scholia vetera*, in their own comments on the verse. In this way, as later scholars drew upon and reacted to the work of their predecessors, a tradition of interpretation evolved that considered the scholiast’s view and Hermann’s, often without recognizing their sources, as the only two possible ways of understanding this verse.<sup>3</sup>

1. *Sophoclis “Antigona” . . . instruxit Car. Gottlob Aug. Erfurdt. Cum adnotationibus Godofredi Hermanni* (Leipzig, 1823). In the third edition of Erfurdt (Leipzig, 1830), Hermann construed ξυγγοῖμεν with παθόντες and took ἡμαρτηκότες as a causal participle, which he translated *merito*.

2. On Hermann’s tendency to be dogmatic, see U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *History of Classical Scholarship*, trans. A. Harris (London and Baltimore, 1982), p. 109. In his note Hermann did cite Stephanus (“ . . . *fatebimur*, de quo significatu dixit in Thesouro H. Stephanus”); but the citation is misleading, since Stephanus never discussed ξυγγοῖμεν at *Ant.* 926 and, more important, he never endorsed *fateor* as a legitimate translation of συγγινώσκω (in general, Stephanus recognized only *eadem sentio, conscius sum, agnosco*, and *ignosco* as translations of συγγινώσκω in the active voice).

3. Perhaps the most influential supporter of Hermann’s view was F. Ellendt, whose *Lexicon Sophocleum*, originally published in 1835 and reedited by Genthe in 1872, remains the standard Sophoclean lexicon to this day (Ellendt was a great admirer of Hermann; cf. his praefatio, p. vi). The most important nineteenth-century defender of the scholiast’s view was probably A. Boeckh, “Über die Antigone des Sophokles,” *Abh. der hist.-philol. Klasse der k. Akad. der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, aus dem Jahre 1828 (published 1831), p. 89, reprinted in his text of the *Antigone* ([Berlin, 1843], p. 266). LS<sup>8</sup> agrees with Hermann, LSJ<sup>9</sup> with the scholiast; most recently, A. C. Moorhouse, *The Syntax of Sophocles*, Mnemosyne suppl. 75 (Leiden, 1982), p. 260, also agrees with the scholiast (“through suffering I shall recognize that I have erred”).

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Which of these two ways of understanding  $\xi\upsilon\gamma\gamma\upsilon\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$  is correct? Probably neither, since each requires an apparently unparalleled use of the verb  $\sigma\upsilon\gamma\gamma\iota\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\omega$ . On the one hand,  $\sigma\upsilon\gamma\gamma\iota\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\omega$  is regularly used by other authors in the sense “be conscious [that . . .]” with a supplementary participle in indirect discourse; but when the verb is so used it seems always to be found with a reflexive pronoun in the dative.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand,  $\sigma\upsilon\gamma\gamma\iota\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\omega$  can be used without a reflexive dative in the sense “confess [that . . .]”; but when it is so used the indirect statement is apparently never expressed by a participle.<sup>5</sup> If it is unlikely, then, that  $\xi\upsilon\gamma\gamma\upsilon\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$  means “be conscious [that . . .]” at *Antigone* 926—since it is not used with a reflexive dative—and if it is also unlikely that the verb means “confess [that . . .]”—since the presumed indirect discourse is expressed by a participle—we would do well to start again *tabula rasa*, abandoning the notion that  $\xi\upsilon\gamma\gamma\upsilon\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$  must be construed with a participle in indirect discourse, and looking instead for a new grammatical interpretation of 926.<sup>6</sup>

Such an interpretation may be found as early as Camerarius’ paraphrase in his commentary of 1534: “si mea poena et Dis probatur et ego merito sustineo, veniam datam volo iis qui me perdunt, sin plector iniuste, videant ne plus sibi accersant meo supplicio quam ego accipiam.”<sup>7</sup> Elsewhere Sophocles uses  $\sigma\upsilon\gamma\gamma\iota\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\omega$  and its cognates only in the sense “pardon.”<sup>8</sup> Camerarius’ interpretation is thus consistent with Sophoclean usage, and it also makes quite good sense. Antigone would say, in effect (925–29): “If it is right in the sight of the gods that I suffer these things, then having suffered them I would be forgiving, since I will have been wrong in what I did. But if these people are

4. Cf. the examples cited by LS<sup>8</sup> and LSJ<sup>9</sup>.  $\xi\upsilon\gamma\gamma\iota\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\omega$  can be used without the reflexive dative in the middle voice, but in these cases (e.g., Hdt. 1. 45. 3, 4. 126) indirect discourse is expressed by the infinitive (the indirect statement can also be expressed by an infinitive when the dative is present, e.g., Hdt. 5. 53. 1).

5. So R. C. Jebb, *Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments*<sup>2</sup> (Cambridge, 1891), p. 167, quoting Hermann’s paraphrase,  $\delta\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\eta\sigma\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu$ , without attribution. For  $\sigma\upsilon\gamma\gamma\iota\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\omega$  without the dative LSJ<sup>9</sup> lists only examples with indirect discourse expressed by an infinitive or by a  $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ -clause (once: Pl. *Leg.* 717D, also cited by Jebb), and LS<sup>8</sup> gives only our passage as an example of the use of a participle. LSJ<sup>9</sup> and Jebb have probably misconstrued Pl. *Leg.* 717D, which is more likely to be an instance of  $\sigma\upsilon\gamma\gamma\iota\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\omega$  meaning “forgive” followed by a causal clause ( $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$  = “since”): “when they are angry . . . he should give way to them; for a father . . .” (B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, vol. 3 [Oxford, 1892], p. 100).

6. M. W. Humphreys, *The “Antigone” of Sophocles* (New York, 1891), p. 151, argued (a) that taking  $\xi\upsilon\gamma\gamma\upsilon\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$   $\eta\mu\alpha\rho\tau\eta\kappa\omicron\tau\epsilon\varsigma$  to mean “become conscious of my error” would fail to explain *how* Antigone would become conscious of her error, since  $\pi\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$  cannot be the means; for in that case her suffering at all (which is now a certainty) would be proof of her guilt”; and (b) that taking  $\xi\upsilon\gamma\gamma\upsilon\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$  to mean “acknowledge” would also be unsatisfactory, since “this would force us to seek some other meaning in  $\pi\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$  than the punishment she is about to suffer.” All this may well be true; but such argumentation assumes that Antigone is going to be perfectly logical, when there is good reason to excuse her, on the point of death, if she is not. For Humphreys’ interpretation of this passage, see below, n. 7.

7. Σοφοκλέους τραγωδίαί [sic] ἑπτὰ / *Sophoclis tragoediae septem . . . auctore Ioachimo Camerario* (Grossenhain, 1534), p. 85 of commentary. The same interpretation was offered more recently by Humphreys, “*Antigone*,” p. 151, and by F. A. Paley, *The “Antigone” of Sophocles, with Brief English Notes for School Use* (London, 1899), p. 82. Humphreys and Paley appear to have developed their interpretations independently of each other and of Camerarius. Like Camerarius, Paley gives no reason why this interpretation is preferable; for Humphreys’ reasons, see above, n. 6.

8. See the references in Ellendt–Genthe, *Lexicon*, p. 702. Similarly, Euripides uses  $\sigma\upsilon\gamma\gamma\iota\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\omega$  and its cognates only in the sense “pardon”: see the references in J. T. Allen and G. Italie, *A Concordance to Euripides* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954), p. 589. Aeschylus’ one use of the verb (*Supp.* 215–16) has the closely related sense “have a fellow-feeling for another” (cf. LSJ<sup>9</sup>, s.v. IV).

wrong in what they are doing, then may they suffer [as much but] no more evil than they do to me."<sup>9</sup> The object of Antigone's forgiveness, though unexpressed, is easily supplied from verses 927–28, as it is in Camerarius' paraphrase (*iis qui me perdunt*). Indeed, similarities of structure and language show that verses 925–26 and 927–28 are meant to be antithetical; if ξυγγνωῖμεν is understood as "forgive" there is a clear balance in thought between the first pair of verses, in which Antigone speaks of the treatment Creon should receive if she is in error, and the second, in which she speaks of the treatment he would receive if he is himself in error.<sup>10</sup> Verses 925–26 would of course be ironic: Antigone no more foresees the possibility of forgiving Creon than she admits the possibility that she has been wrong up till now;<sup>11</sup> but feigned humbleness and willingness to forgive are an effective rhetorical device, sharpening by contrast the bitterness of her subsequent condemnation of Creon.

But if Camerarius' interpretation makes such good sense, why has it been ignored by almost all modern editors? The answer may again lie in the nineteenth-century commentaries and their interaction. Nauck, who interpreted ξυγγνωῖμεν as "become conscious" ("zu dem Bewusstsein gelangen," "erkennen"), added at the end of his comment: "An die Bedeutung verzeihen zu denken verbieten hier die Gesetze der Grammatik."<sup>12</sup> The statement is puzzling, since Camerarius' interpretation is grammatically correct, and Nauck did not elaborate. A bit of history would be helpful here. Nauck's was a reedition of the commentary of Schneidewin, who had construed ξυγγνωῖμεν with παθόντες to make Antigone's sufferings the object of ξυγγνωῖμεν.<sup>13</sup> In fact, συγγινώσκω in the sense "forgive" cannot be construed with a participle to express the object of one's forgiveness;<sup>14</sup> but there is no grammatical reason why ξυγγνωῖμεν could not mean "forgive" with Antigone's persecutors as the understood dative object. Nauck, however, does not seem to have considered this possibility. Rather, thinking only of Schneidewin's commentary, which he was reediting, Nauck responded with the categorical statement quoted above. Schneidewin's original edition soon passed out of print, and Nauck's revision, which still bore Schneidewin's name, became through its several printings the principal text and

9. "Vel imprecatur ut non plus, id est tantum mali accipiant quantum dent sibi": Camerarius, Σοφοκλέους τραγωδίαί, p. 85.

10. Note also that in Greek one normally does not accord συγγνώμη to another because of one's own ἀμαρτία; rather, one's own ἀμαρτία is often grounds for obtaining συγγνώμη from another (cf., e.g., Eur. *Andr.* 840; Thuc. 1.32.8, 3.40.1; Xen. *Cyr.* 6.1.37; Dem. 18.274). In 927–28, however, Antigone pointedly withholds her pardon for Creon's error: in this context verses 925–26 are almost certainly an ironic manipulation of the same ideas of error and pardon.

11. The lesser likelihood is indicated by the use of the optative, ἄν ξυγγνωῖμεν, instead of a future indicative. For Antigone's irony note also μὴ πλείω κακὰ / πάθοιεν (927–28). For her conviction that she is right in her beliefs, cf. 943 contrasted with 924.

12. *Sophokles, erklärt von F. W. Schneidewin*, vol. 4: "*Antigone*"<sup>6</sup>, besorgt von August Nauck (Berlin, 1869), p. 116.

13. "... dann muss ich wohl für das Erduldete Verzeihung üben, als des Vergehens schuldig," "Gelte ich für schuldig, dann will ich verzeihen was ich gedult": *Sophokles, erklärt von F. W. Schneidewin*, vol. 4: "*Antigone*" (Leipzig, 1852), p. 115. Recall that Hermann had construed παθόντες with ξυγγνωῖμεν (in the sense of *fatebimur*) in his third edition of Erfurdt: see above at nn. 1 and 2.

14. See H. Bonitz, *Beiträge zur Erklärung des Sophokles*, vol. 2 (Vienna, 1857), pp. 57–58 (repr. from *Sitzungsber. der philos.-hist. Classe der k. Akad. der Wissenschaften* 23 [1857]: 353–54); after refuting Schneidewin, Bonitz endorsed the *schol. vet.* without reservation and then quoted Boeckh (see above, n. 3).

commentary of Sophocles used for several generations in Germany.<sup>15</sup> Many others, I suggest, reading Nauck's commentary and not realizing that his statement applied only to Schneidewin's interpretation, accepted as fact that ξυγγνοίμεν here could not mean "forgive." That they did so should not be surprising, since almost everyone else seemed to be arguing only over whether the verb meant "be conscious" or "confess."

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15. On the importance of the Schneidewin-Nauck edition, see Wilamowitz, *History*, p. 147. It is a curious coincidence that the influential commentaries of Hermann and Nauck were both reeditions of earlier works.

### COTTA OFF MELLARIA AND THE IDENTITIES OF FUFIDIUS

Two men of the Sertorian War, neither of great account, have recently become the subject of scholarly interest. Their story is briefly told. When Q. Sertorius returned from Africa in 80 B.C. to launch his great uprising in Spain, he defeated, first, a certain Cotta in a naval engagement off Mellaria (near Punta de la Peña, ca. 70 km southeast of Cadiz) and later a commander by the name of Fufidius in a battle on the banks of the river Baetis (now Guadalquivir).<sup>1</sup> Plutarch calls Fufidius the governor of Hispania Ulterior (ὁ ἄρχων τῆς Βαιτικῆς); nothing else is known of Cotta, though he has always been identified with one of the three brothers C., M., and L. Aurelius Cotta.<sup>2</sup> Fufidius is generally taken to be the *primpilaris* L. Fufidius, who was endowed by Sulla with a seat in the senate and a praetorship in 81 or 80, and who suggested to Sulla that he publish the lists of proscription.<sup>3</sup> In a recent study, P. O. Spann decided in favor of C. Cotta and, while accepting the traditional identification of Fufidius, argued that not he but Cotta was the governor of Ulterior.<sup>4</sup> Pointing to the *nobilitas* of the Aurelii Cottae and the presumably humble origins of Fufidius, he reasoned that Cotta would never have served under such an upstart. As for Plutarch's calling Fufidius ἄρχων, Spann suggests that he was in fact Cotta's quaestor or legate and that the biographer misunderstood some phrase like "quem pro praetore in castris apud flumen Baetim relictum supra diximus" that he had found in Sallust's *Histories*.

1. Plut. *Sert.* 12. 3-4; cf. Sall. *H.* 1. 108. Jerzy Linderski kindly read a draft of this study and offered helpful suggestions. Research for this article was made possible in part by a grant from the Council on Research and Creative Work of the University of Colorado.

2. Earlier scholars preferred Lucius: D. Wilsdorf, "Fasti Hispaniarum Provinciarum," *Leipziger Studien* 1 (1878): 63-140, esp. 118; P. R. von Bieńkowski, "Kritische Studien über Chronologie und Geschichte des sertorianischen Krieges," *W/S* 13 (1891): 145; W. Stahl, *De Bello Sertoriano* (Ph.D. diss., Erlangen, 1907), p. 44. More recently, Marcus and especially Gaius have been favored: T. R. S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, vol. 2 (New York, 1952), p. 80; G. V. Sumner, *The Orators in Cicero's "Brutus"* (Toronto, 1973), p. 110.

3. Sall. *H.* 1. 55. 21 (*oratio Lepidi*); Plut. *Sull.* 31. 4; Flor. 2. 9. 25; Oros. 5. 21. 3. The identification is discussed below, sections II-III.

4. "C., L. or M. Cotta and the 'Unspeakable' Fufidius: A Note on Sulla's *Res Publica Restituta*," *CJ* 82 (1986/87): 306-9.